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Abstract: In this commentary, we argue that studies similar to Cennamo, Marchesi, and Meyer 
(2020) should distinguish four dimensions of control in blockchain governance, all of which could 
be more or less decentralized. For some of these dimensions, decentralization is likely beneficial, 
while for others centralization may be preferable. Cennamo et al. (2020) provide evidence that the 
initial design stages of blockchain systems benefit from centralization. Future research is needed 
to provide empirical insights for other dimensions of control in blockchain governance. 
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In our work on blockchain governance, we have argued that there are different dimensions 
of decentralization, a key concern in blockchain systems. Reviewing the blockchain literature, we 
found that studies have shown different aspects of control in blockchain governance to be 
centralized in practice. Even though blockchain networks are often referred to as decentralized, 
the initial system development (Beck, Mueller-Bloch, & King, 2018), subsequent system updates 
(Azouvi, Maller, & Meiklejohn, 2018), and transaction validation itself (Arnosti & Weinberg, 
2018) all exhibit elements of centralization. 
Cennamo, Marchesi, and Meyer (2020) make an important contribution to this discourse 
by suggesting that digital currencies enabled by their own blockchain system are more centralized, 
and by demonstrating the price consequences of this centralization. Distinguishing between coins 
(enabled by their own blockchain system) and tokens (enabled by a third party blockchain system), 
they argue that setting up their own coins (as opposed to tokens) allows firms to dictate how the 
underlying blockchain system works, which allows for a better fit with the intended purpose. 
Therefore, they characterize coins as more centralized than tokens. Cennamo et al. (2020) further 
provide empirical evidence that coins are more valuable than tokens in the long term and suggest 
that the difference in valuation is driven by this centralization.   
As Cennamo et al. (2020) point out, it is paradoxical that centralized blockchain-based 
digital currencies are more valuable. This is because blockchain's promise is the maintenance of 
reliable shared records without a need for trusted third parties. Blockchain systems provide a 
solution to keep records in a decentralized and yet trustworthy fashion (Halaburda & Mueller-
Bloch, 2019; Lumineau, Wang, & Schilke, 2020; Zachariadis, Hileman, & Scott, 2019). The catch 
is that in blockchain systems decentralized record-keeping is not an inherent technology feature, 
but an outcome of free individual decisions. For instance, in Bitcoin miners form mining pools, 
thereby centralizing power (Arnosti & Weinberg, 2018; Alsabah & Capponi, 2020; Cong, He & 
Li, 2020). Therefore, in blockchain systems there is always a risk of centralization and thus 
emergence of intermediaries, even though blockchain systems are expected to eliminate 
intermediaries. 
Using blockchain systems is costly, due to their immutable nature and the expensive use 
of consensus algorithms. Therefore, it only makes sense to use blockchain systems if there is an 
intention to keep records in a decentralized way. Accordingly, one would expect centralized 
blockchain systems to be less valuable, not more valuable, as Cennamo et al. (2020) suggest. We 
can reconcile this seeming contradiction, by utilizing a multi-dimensional view of control in 
blockchain systems (Halaburda & Mueller-Bloch, 2019). In analyses similar to Cennamo et al. 
(2020), we should distinguish four dimensions of control in blockchain governance, all of which 
can be more or less decentralized: the initial system development, subsequent system updates, 
transaction validation itself, and transacting. For some dimensions, decentralization is likely 
beneficial, while for others centralization may be preferable. 
When it comes to the initial system development of blockchain-based digital currencies, 
Cennamo et al. (2020) make the important point that choosing a coin, as opposed to a token, allows 
for designing the infrastructure in a way that may work better for the intended purpose. This fit 
between technological infrastructure and application is critical in the blockchain context (Rossi, 
Mueller-Bloch, Thatcher, & Beck, 2019). However, once the digital currency is operating, there is 
no reason for users to trust it if transaction validation is centralized. With a multi-dimensional 
view of control in blockchain governance, we might find that centralization of the initial system 
development and decentralization of transaction validation might result in superior outcomes. This 
would be consistent with the empirical results of Cennamo et al. (2020), since the benefits of 
centralized control during the development stage remain with coins after they start operating. 
Moreover, neither coins nor tokens are inherently centralized or decentralized in terms of 
transaction validation.  
One could of course argue that centralization is also of value once the blockchain system 
is operating. For example, because centralized system updates would easily allow to keep the 
intended strategic positioning in the changing market. This is possible and also in line with the 
argument of Cennamo et al. (2020). However, strategic development of blockchain systems in 
response to changing market needs can also happen in a decentralized way. For instance, in the 
case of Bitcoin, several derivates exist to address different needs in the cryptocurrency market. 
These sprung up in a decentralized way through forks (i.e., splits) of the underlying technological 
infrastructure, as different stakeholders pursued diverging goals and interests (Andersen & Ingram 
Bogusz, 2019).  
We believe that future research would benefit from distinguishing different dimensions of 
decentralization. Cennamo et al. (2020) make an important contribution in providing evidence that 
the initial design stages of blockchain systems may benefit from centralization. However, this may 
not be the case for other governance dimensions. Given the importance of control in blockchain 
governance, future research is needed to provide a more fine-grained picture of when 
decentralization is beneficial, and when centralization is to be preferred. 
Besides the consequences of decentralization in blockchain governance, the antecedents of 
decentralization also deserve more attention. In particular, this is of importance in the context of 
permissionless and permissioned blockchain systems. Permissionless blockchain systems do not 
restrict who can validate transactions, while permissioned blockchain systems only allow selected 
agents to validate. While it is frequently argued that transaction validation in permissionless 
blockchain systems is more decentralized than in permissioned ones (e.g., Liu, Wu, & Xu, 2019), 
we believe that permissioned blockchain systems allow for guaranteeing a higher level of 
decentralization in practice. This is because in such blockchain systems decentralization of 
transaction validation is not an emergent outcome of free individual decisions, but can be enforced 
through off-blockchain agreements (Bakos, Halaburda, & Mueller-Bloch, 2021).  
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